Knowledge technology and the arts: A personal view  by Laske, O.
Pergamon 
Computers Math. Applic. Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 85-88, 1996 
Copyright©1996 Elsevier Science Ltd 
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 
0898-1221/96 $15.00 -I- 0.00 
S0898-1221 (96)00090-9 
Knowledge Technology and the Arts: 
A Personal View 
O.  LASKE 
Harvard Graduate School of Education 
Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. 
laske@cs, bu. edu 
Abst ract - - In  this paper, I examine the effect of knowledge t chnology on the creative arts. I will 
draw on my decades of computer music experience todraw some conclusions about he interaction 
of technology, people, and the arts. 
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1. TECHNOLOGY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
We are here together to obtain insight into some of the newest ools used in music and dance, and 
to see and hear results of using such tools in producing aesthetic artifacts. In many instances, 
the tools in question are grounded in the use of computers, those symbol manipulators which 
have revolutionized our notion of what is artistic craft, expertise, knowledge, even creativity in 
the arts. In twenty years of work with computers, both in research and composition, I have 
been consistently impressed by the fact that the tools I use shape my processes as much as they 
shape my goals. What I have tried to do in redefining musicology is but an outcome of my 
compositional experience with computers. My musicology is based on my theory of composition. 
I have assumed that thinking is situated in some social and technological context, and that it is 
a form of action, rather than a disembodied reflection. 
Over twenty years of working with computers, I have increasingly begun to see them as habitats 
rather than mere tools. They appear to me to be niches defined by a self-environment dialectic. 
On closer scrutiny, this 'environment' is in part something 'outside' of self (viz., hardware), in 
part is it an objectivation of something 'inside' the self (viz., knowledge programmed through 
software). Therefore, any computer habitat has ambiguous features. It can be seen as including 
self, and as being included in self, being both at the same time. It is this dialectic which 
generates endless talk about technology in the arts. What I have called 'composition theory' 
is my attempt o begin to cut into this dialectic with some helpful distinctions. In terms of 
musicology, I have moved over to 'ethnomusicology,' except hat my ethnoculture, the proverbial 
Pacific Island I want to understand, is the computer habitat embedded in our own culture. As 
any good knowledge ngineer knows, the only way to understand pieces of one's own culture 
(such as another's expertise) is to view them as foreign, exotic, despite the familiarity. 
I have been impressed by the fact that just as in composition computer technology puts at 
my disposal new processes (more than just materials), in theoretical investigations it provides 
me with new data sources, and that these new data sources require new theory. It is one of 
the hallmarks of my musicology, which I have called 'cognitive,' that it derives from reflections 
upon the structure of real-time processes made possible by, and monitored by, computers. It has 
been my constant chagrin in the twenty years of my musicological work, that artists tend to view 
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technology in a rather narrow way, namely as tools for producing artifacts. In opposition to this 
view, it has been my conviction that technology is ultimately a tool for self-knowledge deriving 
from forms of situated, technologically embedded, cognition. 
In this matrix, an important question is what part individual development plays in the con- 
struction of new knowledge through use of technology. One part of individual development is 
understanding what one is doing, and what one is groping for. I have found that in order to orient 
myself in the midst of a plethora of technologies, the surest way to find what I need is to try 
to understand my own artistic process (at a particular moment during my adult development). 
Artistic self-knowledge, then, has seemed to me to be a sine qua non of successfully working with 
technology. The vanity and vapidity of so much talk about arts and technology, for me, derives 
from the ignorance about one's own process, and about its developmental rajectory. It is not 
that I have all the answers. What I am suggesting here is that, unless we get developmentally 
more specific about where in her development an artist is, we cannot meaningfully talk about 
some of the important issues posed by using technology in the arts. In this context, my own 
question would be twofold: 
(1) at this stage of my development, can I gain from this technology, and 
(2) what developmental benefit would ensue for me from using this technology. 
I agree with you that unless we develop some theory of artistic development, these questions will 
remain impossible to answer. But even being aware of the developmental issue, and entertain- 
ing some pop-theory of one's own development, will perhaps permit each of us to understand 
that a stupid program provoking its user's intelligence is developmentally (and perhaps artisti- 
cally) better than an intelligent program that makes her stupid (e.g., by overwhelming her with 
complexity); that there is no value in intelligent programs per se (the question being: whose 
intelligence do you mean?). The real question seems to be: 
what is the developmental edge, the stretching, that I as an artist might gain from using 
this technology? 
Another important issue I can only allude to is how social relationships contribute to cognitive 
and artistic development. Perhaps the main value of technology is that it brings people together, 
makes them work on shared problems, rather than providing tools for individualistic problem 
solving. Technology fosters peer collaboration, thus counteracting the intensively competitive 
climate that one finds especially in the field of music. (Poets, at least, gather to critique each 
others' work in a friendly and constructive manner; I have rarely seen composers and choreogra- 
phers show themselves capable of this.) 
When I read descriptions of new technology for use in the arts, what strikes me is that the 
major emphasis usually placed on what I would call expertise, in contrast to what one might call 
creativity. Working in music composition, poetry, as well as research, I have always felt a need 
to distinguish expertise from creativity. The pernicious effect of emphasizing domain-specific 
expertise over across-domains creativity is that technology easily becomes an end in itself, a 
guarantor of artistic success, a fetish. This is especially true in a field as stunningly technical 
as music. When using computer programs to generate poetry, I have always been powerfully 
reminded of the limits of expertise, or know-how, embodied by the computer program. 
Creativity has often been defined in a person-centered way, in which an individual 'has' cre- 
ativity. I prefer a view of creativity that defines it as a relational construct, such that it is 
something emerging from a trinodal structure defined by the three concepts of Person, Domain, 
and Field [1]. While Person is the familiar individual of artistic processes, Domain is the domain 
of expertise, such as music, poetry, or dance, and Field is the group of judges that monitors 
modifications within some Domain. The Field's judges evaluate individuals in terms of changes 
in the structure of some Domain they bring about. In this sense, we say that Schoenberg was a 
creative individual, judging him as an artist who effected lasting and revolutionary changes in the 
domain of music composition. The emphasis here is not on the solitary individual called Schoen- 
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berg alone, but on the structure of the Domain in which he worked at the time that he composed, 
and on the sociopolitical monitoring of his Domain by contemporary critics and theoreticians. 
Expanding this trinodal scheme slightly, I can formulate a hypothesis regarding the function 
of computer technology in the development of creativity. It seems to me that this technology is
a bridge between two of the three nodes of the "creativity triangle," viz., Person and Domain. 
Computer technology is both a means for enhancing an artist's understanding of her chosen 
domain, and a means for acquiring self-knowledge. In my own work, whether theoretical or 
artistic, I have found these two functions of technology inseparable. I have found it difficult 
to understand how one could overlook the obvious potential of existing technologies, to serve as 
means of monitoring, documenting, and understanding human creativity in the arts, in particular 
the ways in which Person and Domain interact in the creative process. 
2. WHY 'KNOWLEDGE TECHNOLOGY'?  
Knowledge is one of the contemporary buzzwords. It is also a term with a two-thousand year 
history not easily restated in a few sentences. It is one of the tragedies of western thinking that 
a theory of knowledge and a theory of the imagination have never been thoroughly fused, even 
in aesthetics. My point in trying to fuse the two gods would be to make it clear that there 
can be no knowledge without imagination, and that, since imagination is bound to the human 
body, there is also no human knowledge independent of the human body. Technology without 
a relationship to the human body is not worth considering. Knowledge technology, then, the 
technology by which to enhance human knowledge and its use in real time, is sterile indeed if it 
does not simultaneously, and intrinsically, enhance the imagination. Much of what is wrong with 
"music and AI," for instance, is that we lack of theory of the musical imagination, and AI does 
not particularly help us acquire one. As a consequence, there also is a lot of technology that does 
not enhance the imagination, but rather buries it. Why, then, present during this conference a 
session on Knowledge Technology? 
To state a point of view, I would operationalize the term creativity, from the Person's perspec- 
tive, as the ability to come up with new problems, and expertise as the ability to solve problems. 
I would like to encourage you to be less than impressed by technology that only helps you solve 
existing problems, rather than generate new ones. I would say, technology that does not help you 
as an artist to generate new problems, to imagine new ways of working in your chosen medium 
(domain), is simply not good enough to be considered by you. And I would surmise that to 
develop a technology that does justice to the imagination, not just to knowledge or expertise, is 
easier if one has insight into the creative process and its use of the imagination. (So when KYMA, 
for instance, defines a sound as a syntax tree and makes that tree visible to us on a computer 
screen [without, alas, giving us a grammar to change many nodes of the tree uniformly and at 
once], then that, I would say, is a step toward enhancing the imagination.) 
3. TO WHAT END? 
You may scold me for not defining knowledge technology more stringently. But I have always 
been more of an agent provocateur than a generator of definitions. My purpose has been to pro- 
pose a perspective in which one might view new technology, and find one's way through the maze 
as which it surrounds us. I have wanted to encourage you to begin to see the necessity to un- 
derstand one's own creative process for choosing one's technology, one's compositional processes, 
one's distinctive problems. What you are perhaps really here for is not to find a way to compose 
your next piece of music or choreography, but to find ways of generating new problems by which 
you can astonish yourself, and which can help you find out about your own idiosyncratic process. 
The knowledge referred to in the term 'knowledge technology' is your own, and ultimately, it is 
your self-knowledge, not some knowledge written up in books or programs outside of you that 
will matter. 
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